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Abstract. This article provides a cross-cultural typology of justice-rendering 
approaches. It provides a framework for examining various systems or orientations 
of justice. By providing a typology we are in a better position to understand how 
various constitutive elements differ in each, and how justice is formulated. We are in 
a better position in understanding our own “criminal justice system” and possible 
directions for change. The typology is offered as a pedagogical, didactic, and 
heuristic schema that encourages more comprehensive understanding of justice-
rendering practices in diverse cultures. In our discussion section we develop some 
suggestions on conceptualizing various justice-rendering systems as “assemblages” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), semiotic regimes, and some thoughts on furthering a 
transformative justice. Necessarily, a transformative justice needs a subject. We 
suggest a possible conceptualization in Schema QD. 
 
Introduction 
This essay is a first approximation in the development of a typology of justice 
rendering-approaches, or paradigms for thought. It furthers the thrust of Kraska 
(2004) in developing eight orientations to “criminal justice,” expanding it to an 
international focus. It is meant as an organizing, didactic, pedagogical, and heuristic 
schema in understanding various systems of justice and their constitutive elements. 
It portrays (see Figure 1) twelve approaches in justice along with nine elements of 
clarification and comparison. It is not exhaustive, in fact it is meant to instigate 
dialogue and critique. Issues such as the separation of justice from law, the 
difference between distributive and retributive justice, multiple and often competing 
forms of justices, and the political economic determinants of each justice approach 
surely can be the basis of further analysis. This essay is less ambitious. In an age of 
overwhelming internet-induced information flow, global conflicts, new forms of 
surveillance and control, ever more micro and macro disciplinary mechanisms, 
transitional societies, and competing models of justice, we are in need of organizing 
schemas, “ideal types” (Weber, 1978), that provide us with a handle or working Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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orientation on the complexities involved. Simplification, off course, comes with a 
cost. It is but a step toward more comprehensive analysis and ultimately, the 
development of more humanistic forms of justice. Accordingly, this essay provides, 
in a short two-page diagram, some key justice approaches and how they differ 
according to select criteria. 
This schematization is also important in the context of a movement in the last 
decade away from identifying university departments as “criminal justice” to 
something more comprehensive, such as social justice or justice studies.
1 There is a 
growing recognition that the study of social control is more comprehensive, more 
interdisciplinary in nature than the title “criminal justice department” suggests. In 
studying our own criminal justice system here in the US we can derive tremendous 
insights from other forms of justice in practice worldwide. 
Previous orientations in theorizing criminal justice have been provided. 
Kraska‟s (2004) illuminating eight orientations in criminal justice highlights the need 
for theorizing the “criminal justice system” (see also Hagan, 1989; Quinney, 1974; 
Marenin and Worrall, 1998; Duffee, 1990; Bernard and Engel, 2001; King, 1981; 
Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990). Thus in Kraska‟s framework four orientations are 
concerned with what we generally perceive as the formal criminal justice system, the 
other four, state and non-state responses outside of the formal criminal justice 
system. He compares each along twelve dimensions. Other typologies have been 
developed that connect theories of crime with criminal justice policy, justice and 
court models, and level and type of interventional practices (see Einstadter and 
Henry, 1995, 18-19; Henry and Milovanovic, 1996, 189-196). Black, in Behavior of 
Law (1976), has also specified four “styles of social control” (penal, compensatory, 
therapeutic and conciliatory), although Einstadter and Henry (1995) and Henry and 
Milovanovic (1996) argue that Black‟s models do not sufficiently deal with structural 
components. In the present article, we choose not to stay within the orientation of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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the U.S. form of social control, but extend to the global order. There is much to be 
learned from other cultural practices. We need to expand our imaginary horizon. Our 
approach seeks to build on these previous insightful works in theorizing criminal 
justice. Accordingly, we devise a preliminary schematization of twelve justice-
rendering approaches, each compared along nine dimensions. Clearly, this is not 
exhaustive.  
This article will first provide the constitutive elements of our schema. It will 
follow with a short explication of each approach. A discussion section will follow that 
will critically examine this initiative. We conclude with a discussion about the 
possibilities of a transformative justice. 
 
 
Constitutive Elements. 
 
The selected elements for comparison in our schema include: 
1. Origins/problem defined. This briefly portrays the problem and/or origins; 
2. Legitimation. This focuses on the underlying justifying principle, the feeling of 
righteousness or correctness of some order. Why is it that people feel compelled to 
obey?
2 ; 
3. Rationality. We make use of Weber‟s typology 
3 of law-making and law-finding, 
but modify it to accommodate justice practices. Weber introduces four ideal types: 
formal rationality, substantive rationality, substantive irrationality, and formal 
irrationality.  We can, much like in law-finding, apply this to the underlying logic of 
the justice principle involved, although we also are cognizant of Derrida‟s (1997) 
keen distinction between law and justice, the former being more economic and 
calculation, the latter, more akin to a gift and a duty to the Other. Thus each justice-
rendering practice lays purchase to a more dominant form of rationality; Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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4. Principle of justice. Here we specify what form justice appears. What specific 
principle does the social formation under consideration makes use of in deciding on a 
fair resolution? Often, procedural and substantive justice can both be captured by 
the summaries provided. In other cases, the expanded commentary sections will 
elucidate the differences; 
5. Primary players. The key question here concerns who are most active in the 
process of justice rendering; 
6. Frame/context for application. Understanding, or reality construction, appears 
contextually. We can situate an issue in a very wide spatiotemporal framework, on 
the one hand, or in a very narrow one on the other (see Kelman, 1981). For 
example, the notion of “excusability” or understandability as to why a person 
committed a crime could be situated in a narrow framework where the only relevant 
issue is mens rea and actus reas, or a very wide one in which we look at both micro 
and macro levels for their contributions. The wider the context, the more likely we 
are to find understandability and excusability; conversely, the narrower, the more 
incriminatory. We find, for example, that the relationship between excusability and 
class in legalistic proceedings is inverse; that is, the higher the class standing, the 
more excusability, hence the manifestation of the pyramid structure that official 
crime reports indicate as to the relation between SES and official crime; 
7. Transparency of decision-making. This is the question of knowing who is the 
decision-maker and what criteria are employed. Star-chamber proceedings during 
the dark ages provided a closed system, whereas in New Zealand, the Maori‟s notion 
of restorative justice opens the process up to not only the direct parties of the 
conflict but to families and the community; 
8. Role of negatively impacted. Here we want to know how actively involved are the 
more directly impacted parties. This could be low, where they are passive, such as in 
the traditional due process model, or high as in the case of mediation programs in Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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restorative justice where the disputants take on active roles. In other cases it may 
be more mixed, such as in transitional justice: on occasion, revolt takes place 
forcefully in the streets in regime change; on other occasions, it is a small elite that 
leads, a “revolutionary vanguard”; yet in other cases, such as in restorative justice, 
it is the disputants that are most active; 
9. Discourse. Each justice-rendering approach appears with a particular discourse. 
Signifiers and narratives have a logical construction and mold how reality is 
constructed.
4 We will apply Lacan‟s (1977, 1991)
5 four discourses to indicate the 
discourse more likely to be used. They include: the discourses of the master, 
university, hysteric, and analyst. His is most useful because of the many levels 
within which it operates and because of the tremendous impact his work has had on 
our understanding of structured discourses. Narratives, as many have argued, are 
not just neutral means of communicating one‟s desires; rather they are structured 
with effects, as insightfully explained by the linguistic relativity principle (Whorf, 
1956), language-game tradition (Wittgenstein, 1958), and by those advocating the 
desirability of a multiplicity of “petit narratives” (Lyotard, 1984, 1999). Lacan 
(1977), however, shows how language often speaks the subject. The notion of 
justice, therefore, is a social construct. The use of language can frame the 
construction of justice and its application
6; 
10. Critical commentary. We include a selection of critical authors on the respective 
approaches (publication dates are included in the reference section). 
Figure 1a. Typology of Justice-Rendering Approaches 
 
  Crime Control 
Model/Justice 
Due Process 
Model/Justice 
Actuarial Justice  Inquisitorial 
Justice 
Cadi Justice  Customary Justice 
Origins/ 
Problems 
defined 
Hobbes; “state 
of nature”; 
irreconcilable 
differences; 
bureaucratic 
priorities; 
presumption of 
guilt 
Enlightenment 
period; unequal 
treatment; 
irreconcilable 
differences; 
common law; 
presumption of 
innocence 
Scarce 
resources; 
predict 
dangerousness; 
efficient 
processing; risk 
assessment; risk 
society; 
Roman law; 
Medieval era; 
Catholic Church; 
often, civil law 
based; overcome 
disorder; 
presumption of 
guilt 
Religion; 
divinity; 
unexplainable; 
disorder; 
Shari’ah custom 
defined; 
uncertainties, 
and instabilities 
Natural order; 
boundaries 
transgressed; 
mechahancial 
solidarity; broken 
bonds; peace/ unity 
disrupted; 
supernatural Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
2011, Vol. 3 (1):1-56    Milovanovic  
 
6 
 
uncertainties; 
border crossings 
 
Legitimation  Maintaining 
order: 
conviction and 
clearance rates 
Inalienable 
rights; rule of 
law; quality 
control 
Actuary; cost 
effectiveness; 
social defense 
Administrative 
justice; rule of 
written laws 
Divinity; Qur’an   Custom; mutual aid; 
tradition; spirituality; 
surpernatural 
 
Rationality  Substantive 
irrationality 
Formal 
rationality 
Substantive 
rationality 
Formal rationality  Formal 
irrationality 
Substantive 
irrationality 
 
Principles of 
Justice 
Organizational; 
thin blue line; 
protection 
from chaos; 
“war on crime”  
Formal 
rationality 
Substantive 
rationality 
Formal Rationality  Formal 
Irrationality 
Substantive 
irrationality 
 
Primary 
Players 
Police, 
prosecutor 
Jury, opposing 
lawyers, judge 
Actuary, profiler, 
actuarial tables, 
risk managers 
Judge(s), lay 
judges, legislators 
Cadi, Mullah  Elders(s), clan, 
community, family; 
shaman 
 
Context for 
application 
Medium  Narrow  Narrow  Medium  Wide  Wide 
 
Transparency 
of decision-
making 
Low  High  High  Medium to Low  Low  Low 
 
Role of agent 
impacted 
Low  Low  Low  Low  Medium to High  Low to High  
 
Discourse  Battle 
metaphor; 
master 
discourse 
Battle 
metaphor; 
university 
discourse 
Statistical/ 
risk discourse; 
master discourse 
Administrative; 
university 
discourse 
Religious duties; 
master discourse 
 
Indigenous; master 
discourse 
 
Critical 
Commentary 
Parker, 
Nasheri, 
Herman, Yant, 
Duff, Ashworth 
Packer, Moore, 
van Koppen, 
Penrod 
Feeley, Simon, 
Haggerty, 
Ericson, Zinger, 
O’Malley 
van Koppen, 
Penrod, 
Merryman 
Kamali, Nyazee, 
Makdisi, Hasan, 
Jackson, Haneef 
Hoebel, Elechi, 
Weber, Sumner, 
Malinowski 
                        
 
Figure 1b. Typology of Justice-Rendering Approaches 
  
 
Environmental 
Justice  
Socialist justice   Family 
Model  
Transitional Justice   Restorative 
Justice  
Transformative 
Justice  
Global 
warming/degradat
ion; water, natural 
resources, air; 
toxic dump sites; 
environment 
racism 
Capitalist 
exploitation; 
repression of 
species being; 
revolution to 
socialism and 
communism 
Maturation in 
nuclear 
family; 
conciliable 
differences; 
non-
stigmatizing 
resolutions 
Past injustices; regime 
change; marco: state 
change, post colonial, 
indigenous cultures; 
replacing despotic 
rulers 
Conflict/transgr
essions; Quaker 
and indigenous 
resolutions in 
“mechanical” 
non-state and 
state societies 
Negative investment 
in harm/hierarchy; 
harms of 
reduction/repression
; being rather than 
becoming; molar 
rigidities, stasis; 
disciplinary 
mechanisms; 
reactive forces 
 
Global Order; 
world community 
Proletariat 
rationality; 
“transformative
Patriarchical: 
nuclear 
family 
Tran historical; global 
justice; universal rights 
of persons 
Re-establish 
order, solidarity; 
peacemaking 
Permanent 
revolution; 
becoming; Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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”  actualization of 
desire/ differences/ 
solidarity; 
singularities 
 
Formal Rationality  Substantive  
irrationality 
Substantive 
rationality 
Substantive rationality   Substantive 
irrationality 
Substantive 
rationality/irrationali
ty 
 
Sustainability; 
burdens equally 
distributed 
Needs/ abilities 
principle; 
administrative 
”dictatorship of 
proletariat” 
Ethic of cave; 
reintegrative 
shaming; 
reconciliation 
Restorative; coming to 
terms with past harms; 
apology; compensation 
Reintegration; 
healing; 
forgiveness; 
make amends; 
restore; 
reconciliation 
Ethics of Other; 
softer ethics of care; 
needs, abilities, 
desires; restorative 
justice plus; 
contingent 
universalities 
 
U.N.; NGOs; 
impacted groups; 
state agencies 
State; 
peer/popular 
Tribunals 
Parental 
authority 
Truth and 
Reconciliation/ 
Reparations tribunals 
 
Disputants;  
Mediator;  
Facilitator 
Disputants/communi
ty;  
“multitude”; 
altermmodedrn 
Person; emergents; 
“people yet to come” 
 
Wide  Wide   Wide   Wide   Wide   Wide 
 
Low-High  Low-High  Low-High  High  High  High 
 
Low-High  Low-High  Low  Low-High  High   High 
 
Sustainability; 
discourse of 
hysteric/university  
Communal; 
master/ 
university/ 
hysteric/analyst 
Kin relations; 
master 
discourse 
New order; discourse of 
hysteric/analyst, 
master 
Reconciliation; 
Discourse of  
Hysteric/ 
university 
Becoming; petit 
narratives;  
Discourse of analyst/ 
Hysteric;  
conscientization;  
Discourse of 
Other/care 
 
Cole/Foster, 
Halsey, Taylor, 
Middleton, Seis, 
Agyeman et al 
Marx/Engels, 
Pashukanis, 
Tse-Tung, 
Lenin, Solomon 
Griffiths, 
Gilligan, 
Clement, 
Sevenhuijsen 
Teitel, Fanon, Bhabha, 
Said, Tutu, Spivak, 
Elster, Olsen 
Braithwaite, 
Zher, 
Sullivan/Tifft, 
Acorn, Van 
Ness/Strong, 
Redekop 
Levinas, Derrida, 
Unger, Lyotard, 
Hardt/Negri, 
Deleuze/Guattari, 
Freire, Pavlich, 
Woolford 
 
 
 
Justice-Rendering Approaches 
In this section we provide a brief overview of each justice-rendering approach. It is 
not to be construed as an exhaustive explication, but more in the form of providing 
orientation points necessary for locating differences. 
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Crime Control Model/Justice. This orientation 
7 responds to the overwhelming 
caseload of the courts. It can be traced to a Hobbesian underlying assumption of the 
“state of nature” and the irreconcilable nature of crime. Faced with the need to move 
the processing of cases, this model relies on bureaucratic imperatives in its 
functioning with an underlying presumption and working definition of guilt. It‟s 
legitimation principle is identified with the ability to obtain high clearance and 
conviction rates. Plea bargaining and moving the assembly line become priorities. 
Even similar cases can have vastly different outcomes (substantive irrationality). The 
principle of justice is more focused on protecting society from immanent chaos, the 
“thin blue line.” Key players in this model are the police and prosecutors. An arrest is 
seen as presumptive evidence that the defendant needs to overcome. Decision-
making makes use of contexts and frameworks that go outside the dictates of formal 
rationality and due process, with the dictates of bureaucratic efficiency being 
determinative. Understanding precisely how a decision is made remains a mystery to 
recipients of the process. “Let‟s make a deal” justice arrives with wide disparities in 
outcomes, with little formal guidance in the process. More recently in the U.S., the 
Supreme Court has ruled in favor of the use of plea bargaining. The defendant‟s role 
in the process is minimal, relegated to passive acceptance of the deals being made. 
The discourse makes use of a battle metaphor (apposing lawyers doing battle; 
winner takes all; being “shot down”; bullpen; etc.). It is a master discourse in which 
bureaucratic lingo rooted in the battle model provides coordinates for linguistic 
constructions and use, within which an ideology of efficiency, expediency, and finality 
prevail. 
 
Due Process Model/Justice. This orientation, in contrast to the crime control model, 
has its roots in the Enlightment, Rousseau‟s answer to Hobbesian‟s “state of nature.” 
It responds to the excesses, vastly unequal treatment, and barbaric forms of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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punishment of the dark ages. Most often, it is built on the common law tradition with 
fundamental fairness rooted in the rule of law and principles of inalienable rights 
(formal rationality, formal equality). The rules themselves provide the legitimacy of 
the system. Results are more uniform and predictable. Unlike the assembly line of 
the crime control model, this model focuses on quality control, the ever present 
presumption of innocence and the possibility of error (Packer, 2004). Formal equality 
and uniform application of standards are the bases of justice. The primary players 
are jurors, opposing lawyers, and the judge. The formal proceedings assure that 
equally situated sides battle for the truth with an impartial judge or jury objectively 
deciding on the merits of the case. The context of application of the law is narrow; it 
is focused on the letter of the law. All are aware or made aware of the principles of 
justice and processes involved in making a decision. The process is highly 
transparent on its face. The defendant, however, plays a minor role in the process, 
relegated more to spectator. The discourse in use is rooted in a battle metaphor 
(apposing sides, battle for the truth, etc.). A dominant legal discourse, “legalese,” is 
what provides the coordinates for narrative constructions, logic, and rationality. 
Accordingly, this university discourse provides a narrow framework within which 
reality is constructed. 
 
Actuarial Justice. This orientation‟s origins stem from scarce resources and the 
demands of social defense. Danger and dangerous persons lurk in the real world, and 
this model is less interested in etiology than in protection of society from impulsive 
transgressors. Accordingly, the response to uncertainty is prediction instruments, 
risk assessments, and profiling. Legitimation revolves around accurately predicting 
dangerousness and minimizing risk. It is substantive rational to the extent some 
actual prediction instrument is being used which is often external to what is 
espoused by due process; with this instrument used uniformly, it is a rational system Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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in the Weberian sense of prediction. Hence, the principles of justice are probabilistic 
which focuses on the reduction of possible harm. The primary players are the 
actuary, profilers, actuarial tables, and risk managers. The context or framework for 
application is narrow in the sense that a small group of identifiable determinants are 
constitutive of the prediction instrument. The transparency is high in so much as we 
can eventually locate the instrument being employed and its constitutive elements. 
The role of those negatively impacted is low. Agents are reduced to passivity. The 
discourse is more statistically based. The discourse of the master prevails where the 
logic of the risk assessment instrument prevails over other discourses. 
 
Inquisitorial Justice. This orientation can be traced back to the Roman law tradition, 
the medieval era, and the Catholic Church. It is rooted more in the civil law tradition. 
It was and is a way of dealing with disorder. It‟s medieval expression was the 
barbaric form in which confessions were elicited by the most hideous forms of pain 
imaginable in order for electing the confessions. More recent expression, however, 
maintains the inquisitorial nature – presumption of guilt – without the extreme 
excesses of the medieval era. Legitimation is more rooted in administrative justice 
where the judge(s) is a much more active party in evidence gathering and 
questioning of witnesses. Legitimation is based more on written laws themselves. It 
is therefore more formal rational. The principle of justice is more focused on formal 
equality and uniform application of fairness. Unlike common law, this civil law form 
does not build on precedence. Rather, legislators codify what is appropriate law. The 
primary players therefore are the judges, lay judges, lay assessors, and legislators. 
The context or framework of application are medium to the extent that judges or lay 
judges make use of wider parameters in their fact-gathering investigative processes. 
For example, often times a judge can question a defendant‟s background. 
Transparency is medium to high; high to the extent decision making is based on the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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rule of law; medium to the extent that defendants are not fully cognizant of the 
internal cognitive processes of the investigative authorities (judge(s), lay judge(s), 
lay assessors). Often the lay assessors first vote followed by a decisive judge‟s vote. 
The role of the agent negatively impacted is low in so much as s/he is reduced to 
passivity in the process. The discourse employed revolves around administrative 
justice and the rule of written laws. Hence, this is a university discourse in which 
narratives, signifiers, semiotic codes are restricted to a particular form of 
construction, and accordingly, a particular way of constructing reality. 
 
Cadi Justice. During the upheavals in the Middle East and surrounding areas between 
the 7
th and 13
th centuries (the so-called Abbasid era) the need emerged for the 
Caliphs (prophets) to better govern the land. The answer was the Cadi, a judge who 
would not only help resolve conflicts but also try crimes against God. The Cadi was a 
response to disorder that could not be kept in check by otherwise community norms. 
It dealt with disorder, unexplainables, otherwordly events. Guidance and legitimation 
is by way of the Koran (Qur‟an). Decision-making is formal irrational to the extent 
that even seemingly similar situated peoples in conflict would invariably receive 
different treatment as the concrete situation determined the rulings. The involved 
parties cannot with certainty determine how precisely the Cadi came to his decision, 
making it irrational in the Weberian sense, and low on transparency. The principle of 
justice focuses on substantive fairness and is flexible in how it arrives at a decision. 
The primary players are the Cadi, or in other forms, the Mullah. The framework or 
context within which the Cadi works in coming up with his decision is wide. The role 
of agents impacted is high since the Cadi actively elicits their input to the conflict at 
hand. The discourse employed is a master discourse (the Cadi, in drawing from his 
understanding of the Koran, has overall power in employing narratives that are Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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enshrined in God‟s words), and university discourse (reliance on a body of material, 
the Koran).  
 
Customary Justice. In this orientation, origins of problems are traced to 
transgressions of natural boundaries, of broken bonds, and disruptions to peace and 
unity. Legitimation is traced to custom, tradition, mutual aid, spirituality, and the 
supernatural in an otherwise stateless society. Sometimes sorcery, witchcraft and 
magic are constituents of legitimation. Often a Creator or existence of spirits are 
stipulated and substantive irrationality prevails, as some standard theoretically does 
exist within which decision-making takes place, but outcomes are diverse, even 
given like cases. The spirit has access to the truth and it can pass judgment on a 
case. Sometimes it is the shaman or sorcerer who has access to the truth, often by 
the use of magic. And at other times it is the clan‟s elders who do law-finding 
through negotiation, mediation and arbitration. The principle of justice is concerned 
with re-establishing broken bonds, re-establishing order, peace and unity. Often 
sought in justice rendering is reconciliation, reparations to put things back in 
peaceful, holistic order. Ostracism and banishment are used in worst cases, but with 
each, the culprit is given an opportunity to re-unite back in the clan, and, often, the 
record of transgression is erased from community memory. The primary players are 
the elders, clan, community, family, shamans, and sorcerers. The context or 
framework for application is wide, and the transgressor‟s act is placed in a holistic 
context. The transparency of the decision-making is low, as the final decision 
rendered may have invoked various supernatural entities in coming up with a 
decision in a particular case. The transgressor or disputant has very little access to 
the actual process by which the final decision is made. Even when the elders mediate 
or arbitrate and somehow invoke a divine being or the spirits, the disputants never 
know with certainty what they may be saying. The role of the person impacted is at Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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times low where s/he is a recipient of an other wordly power‟s pronunciation; at 
other times, it is high, where disputants or, more often, their representatives 
(family, clan) more actively try to resolve the case by way of the mediation efforts of 
elders. The master discourse is prominent. A somewhat inaccessible matrix of master 
signifiers are invoked, coming from a spirit or Creator, invoked by a shaman or 
sorcerer, which are the coordinates of narrative constructions, logic, and rationality.  
 
Environmental Justice. In this orientation, the problem is global degradation, 
pollution of natural resources, toxic dump cites, and disparate impact. Legitimation is 
sought in the idea of a global order, a world community. Formal rational decision-
making is of a premium. Principles of justice revolve around the notion of 
sustainability and burden being equally distributed. Primary players include non-
government organizations (NGOs), United Nations forums, organizational efforts and 
struggles of directly impacted groups, and State agencies charged specifically with 
environmental issues. The context and framework for application is wide, it is global, 
as we become more aware of the effects of pollutants in one area having 
ramifications in other areas. The transparency of justice rendering is high to low; 
high, when organized groups struggle from beginning to end with their efforts, in the 
process gaining an acute understanding of the larger issues; low, when a struggle 
against environmental damage is relegated to lawyers and legislators where 
decision-making becomes more hidden in actions and words. The role of the agent 
impacted may be, at times, high, where a struggling group organizes and fights till 
the end; it can also be low where the person(s) affected are rendered passive 
recipients of political and bureaucratic pronouncements. The discourse in use is the 
language of sustainability and hence in the form of the discourse of the university; it 
can also be the discourse of the hysteric where laypersons seek expert‟s advice 
concerning the effects of pollution and environmental degradation. Hence, for the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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latter, those affected will incorporate the technical lingo of the experts in further 
construction of the problem. 
 
Socialist Justice. The capitalist mode of production is said to maintain hierarchy and 
exploitation, and denies a person‟s species being. It is also said that this mode of 
production, because of it‟s internal crises, will eventually transform into socialism 
and then communism, “the higher form.” Legitimation in socialism is based on 
proletariat rationality, but is also, at this stage, a “transformative” principle which 
culminates with communism and substantive equality. Thus substantive rationality is 
maintained in the former; substantive irrationality in the latter. The principle of 
justice is the “needs” principle, or more accurately, the needs and abilities principle.
8 
During the transitional period, the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” proletariat 
rationality would be engendered. During the higher forms, the needs/abilities 
principle would be guiding. The primary players during socialism is the State and 
revolutionary tribunals; during the higher form, popular and peer tribunals. The 
context and framework from which justice is established is wide as both micro and 
macro level determinants are connected with individual excesses. The transparency 
of the decision-maker is low to high; low, in the earlier transitional stage where the 
dictatorship of the proletariat rule with a particular idealogy; high in the higher forms 
where community mutual aid would also assure maximal participation in all decisions 
directed at the person. The role of the agent impacted would be low to high; low, in 
the initial stage of socialism where the person is subject to the State‟s transitional 
policies and the dictatorship of the proletariat at all levels; high in the higher forms 
where the agent is an active participant in her/his self development. The discourse of 
the master, often appearing in the discourse of the university (proletariat ideology) 
and hysteric (persons in struggle) would be most prominent in the socialist forms, 
giving way to the discourse of the hysteric/analyst in the higher forms. The former Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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because during the transitional phase the proletariat would be in struggle in finding 
it‟s new consciousness, aided by a ubiquitous proletariat discourse, enforced in direct 
administrative commands. The latter due to the communal, non-hierarchical and 
substantive irrational principle of reasoning involved. The higher forms would focus 
on the discourse of struggle, but with a non-directive response by the other 
(discourse of the analyst) in developing ever new master signifiers that would be 
more reflective of being and becoming. 
 
Family Model. This orientation was developed by Griffith (1970) in contradistinction 
to the “battle model” (due process and crime control models) postulated by Packer 
(2004) in our first two models of justice-rendering approaches. It is rooted in the 
family and the development of the child who inevitably would transgress during 
maturational development. Unlike the battle model, the family strives to both 
demonstrate the wrongfulness of the act through punishment of various intensities, 
and is also engaged in the reconciliation and the reintegration of the child back into 
the family with respect and love, without attributing a master status on the child. 
This non-stigmatizing form of shaming (Braithwaite, 1989) brings back order and 
stability in the family. It is then suggested that this model can be employed more 
macroscopically. Given, in Griffiths‟ model is a paternalistically governed nuclear 
family with clear identities of father, mother, child. The principle of legitimation is 
patriarchy, the father‟s word; or, where there is a matriarch, more often there is still 
engendering the principles of a patriarchical order. Substantive rationality prevails, 
since some standard is employed and there is an attempt to treat all children in the 
same family, given a similar transaction, in a similar way. It is substantive to the 
extent that principles of patriarchy are employed, being only one of other 
possibilities (i.e., alternatively based on equality between father and mother; non 
nuclear families; LGBTQ orientations, etc.). The principle of justice is an ethic of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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care, reintegrative shaming, and reconciliation. The primary player is parental 
authority, with the emphasis on the sanctity of the patriarchic order and the father 
figure. The context and framework of application of justice-rendering is wide, since 
the parental authority seeks to contextualize the indiscretions. The transparency of 
the parent could be low to high; low when no explanation is provided to the 
transgressor; high when a full explanation of the punishment is provided. The role of 
the child is low, for s/he is seen as immature, undergoing the pangs of maturation. 
The master discourse is prominent, rooted in phallocentricism. 
 
Transitional Justice. This orientation is focused on regime change from a previous 
repressive order to, ideally, a new, more just order. This has been very prominent 
during the 1980s and 1990s in Central and South America, Eastern Europe and 
Africa and is still ongoing. The principle of justice at play is transhistorical, often 
seeking global justice principles and universal rights. It is substantive rational to the 
extent some principle of justice is articulated. It is external to the previous dominant 
form of a repressive order. Once at play, it is applicable to all similarly situated. The 
principle of justice centers on coming to terms with the past repressive regimes and 
what to do with the previous exploiters. Often, formal equality, identified with some 
conception of “universal rights of man,” becomes guiding in establishing principles of 
justice. Primary players include truth and reconciliation and reparation tribunals. At 
other times, the traditional criminal justice system is applied with traditional forms of 
punishment. The context and framework for application are wide, for, transformers 
are seeking an understanding of the macro-level context of the previous repressive 
order; trying, for example, to determine responsibility of “higher ups.” It is high also 
because the new order is trying to establish wide-ranging understanding and ways of 
effectively dealing with the past in order to move on to the future. The transparency 
of decision-making is high, since much public attention centers on those responsible Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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for past harms and what to do with the culprits. Existing here are highly publicized 
investigations, arrests, hearings, trials, forums, forms of punishment, and tribunals 
for reparations. The role of agent(s) impacted can be low to high; low, when the 
emerging State takes on exclusive responsibility of the prosecution of cases; 
medium, to the extent that the State‟s organs elicit narratives/stories of those 
previously harmed; high, where mass and sometimes spontaneous demonstrations 
in the streets temporarily lodge all powers with those directly repressed by the 
previous regime. The discourse of the hysteric is most prominent, for the previously 
exploited seek a new identity, a new order, coming to terms with the past – a 
continuous struggle – with the consequence that an ever new identity is being 
formulated during the transitional phase. Beyond this, we can only speculate with the 
historic examples before us: in some cases, a new repressive regime is resurrected 
and thus the discourse of the master prevails; in some cases, an orientation on 
identity politics is dominant with a nostalgic return to origins; on the other end of the 
continuum are emergent States in which the search for identity are continuous, such 
as in post colonial transitions, and hence a discourse of the hysteric and analyst is at 
play.  
 
Restorative Justice. This orientation has had a long history from ancient times and 
stateless societies. Conflict was often assumed to be ubiquitous and in need of 
resolution, in order to re-establish order, peace, and solidarity. It has been a 
continuous practice of indigenous peoples worldwide. In more recent times, the 
influence of the Quakers was quite apparent. Legitimation is based on the principle of 
peacemaking. Justice rendering in this model is substantive irrational to the extent 
that each person is seen as unique. Notions of justice vary with the uniqueness of 
the person. Even apparently similarly situated do not necessarily witness a similar 
outcome. Principles of justice include making amends, reparations, healing, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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foregiveness, apology, taking active responsibility for one‟s harm, and reintegration. 
The notion of shaming has sometimes been a component. The primary players are 
the disputants, family, community, mediators, and facilitators. Components of the 
process include: a face-to-face meeting between the victim and offender; story 
telling by each; expression of emotion; reaching understanding and empathy; and a 
concluding agreement. The context and framework for justice-rendering is wide, 
taking into consideration many factors that are said to be related to the harm. It also 
incorporates various persons beyond the direct disputants. The transparency of the 
decision-making is high, since the disputants themselves try to arrive at an amicable 
solution to the problem. Hence, the role of the impacted is also high, since they 
actively contribute to an understanding reached. The operative discourse is 
reconciliation, and specifically the discourse of the hysteric. The latter is so because 
the victim is in struggle with why s/he was hurt and needs an explanation. Through 
the encounter a particular discourse emerges, moving away from anger and the 
desire for retribution to a discourse of forgiveness and reconciliation, aided often by 
a third party who mediates the process. It can also be conceptualized as a discourse 
of the university as clients are encouraged, often by subtle cues, to internalize the 
language of reconciliation (Woolford, 2009: 85-87). 
 
Transformative Justice. The problem defined in this approach is the existence of 
excessive investments in hierarchy and harm. It produces harms of reduction and 
repression. 
9 Disciplinary mechanisms, originating from historical and political 
economic conditions, coordinate bodily forces in static configurations resulting in 
stasis, being, and repetition of the same. Desire is captured in configurations that 
inhibit the full development of the capacities and potentialities of people both 
individually as well as collectively. The Oedipus is but one of its engines, 
synchronized with the needs of capitalism. Alternatively, a legitimation principle, in Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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an emerging transformative socius, is rooted in “permanent revolution,” a continuous 
becoming of both the human being as well as the social formation. Humans are seen 
as singularities, unmeasurable as to what the body can do while at the same time 
fully capable of forming solidaristic communities that remain molecular in their form. 
Privileged are far-from-equilibrium conditions and dissipative structures, emergents 
that are highly sensitive to perturbations, rather than the rigidities of identities and 
the bureaucratic form. These are “contingent universalities” Butler (1991). 
Accordingly, substantive irrationality and substantive rationality are ubiquitous. We 
cannot subsume a singularity within an abstract measure or standard applicable to 
all in a formally equal way. The principle of justice revolves around the ethics of the 
Other (Levinas, 1987), a duty to the other, a becoming-other (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987). 
10 In response to the extreme logic of becoming-other/becoming 
imperceptible and the potential for disappearing into the totality without any trace of 
agency, a softer ethics of care 
11 is suggested whereby the ethics of the Other is 
tempered by recognition of personal desires. The latter are productive in form, not 
responses to lack. Accordingly, needs, abilities and unique desires are constitutive of 
principles of justice. Elements of restorative justice are employed, but expanded to 
critical structural-level examination and advocating the necessity of ongoing 
(“molecular”) social change. Primary players are the “people yet to come,” incapable 
of being defined in the present or future. There are only ongoing emergent identities. 
Disputants and dispute settlement become more and more orientated to an ethics of 
the Other. This is a logic that militates against premature imprisonment in static 
identities and precise futuristic forecasting. Advocated is a post postmodern or 
“altermodern” person that will emerge in a socius seen as a permanent revolution, 
that privileges becoming over merely being. The context and framework of justice-
rendering is wide, taking into consideration the micro, meso and macro levels of 
configurated forces. The transparency of the decision-maker is high, as continuous Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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feedback is provided to all agents implicated. The role of the agent impacted is high, 
for s/he will actively participate in self discovery, exercise empathy for the Other, 
and engage in solidaristic struggle(s). 
12 A combination of the discourse of the 
hysteric and analyst will be ongoing. Agents insert themselves in this oscillating 
discourse for self understanding, expression, and understanding of the Other. This is 
the realm of becoming, a becoming-other, a becoming-imperceptible (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987). We witness an emergent, dissipation, and re-emergent as non-
repetition of the same. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
We have developed twelve ideal-types of justice-rendering. These are not to be 
construed as exhaustive, but merely as orientations. We are in a national and global 
crisis, with questioning justice center stage. The U.S. with over 2.4 million 
incarcerated, a yearly budget of approximately $70 billion, 750,000 employees, and 
with a recidivism rate after three years of two thirds is paradigmatic of the problem 
we face at the retributive level. The environmental damage being inflicted and its 
disproportional impact in distributive justice are also quite apparent. In this section 
we want to develop three thoughts: the application of assemblage theory which 
provides more dynamic tools for critical analysis; the effects of semiotic regimes; 
and the possible furtherance of a transformative justice. 
 
Assemblages.  Typologies are useful for sensitizing the researcher to some 
complexities, but they are ultimately static in nature. We briefly offer a possible way 
of resurrecting some of the dynamic elements at play. Deleuze and Guattari‟s notion 
of an assemblage is particularly noteworthy (1987: 88; see also Delanda, 2006). An Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
2011, Vol. 3 (1):1-56    Milovanovic  
 
21 
 
assemblage can be defined as a historically-specific, contingent configuration of 
relatively stabilized social entities
13 and flows.
14 It is more process oriented. It 
provides some refinement of constitutive theory in so much as it provides the 
dynamics for change while describing “reality” as an interrelationship amongst the 
macro, micro and meso levels of analysis; each is part of the other, the whole within 
the parts, the parts within the whole. Delanda (2006), for example, has insightfully 
applied it to social networks, persons, organizations and governments. Everything 
that has taken some form can be represented as an assemblage. They are both 
endowed with properties and capacities (ibid., 7). Each of our justice rendering forms 
can be envisioned as an assemblage.  
Assemblages have two perpendicular, intersecting axes
15: the material 
(content)-expression axis, and a territorialization-deterritorialization axis. The 
material role is about diverse underlying forces that are at play
16; it is about how 
bodies are constructed and oriented to each other (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 88, 
90; Delanda, p. 12). It includes the question of obedience and its enforcement 
(Delanda, p. 68).
17 An “abstract machine,” a logic, coordinates these processes. It 
produces cuts in various flows. Consider the law machine (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1986; Bogue, 2003: 78-86): rules, procedures, evidence, standards, proofs, 
verdicts, presumptions, even architecture and the effects on bodies. Expression is 
about how they take on specific expressive form, some of which is linguistic, some 
non-verbal
18; although, expressive forms may also work to react upon content 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 89). 
19 The question of legitimacy of authority (i.e., 
Weber‟s forms of “domination”) is one example, cultural rituals is another. 
Territorialization concerns how these underlying forces are brought within some 
configuration, some being more stable (e.g., “molar”), some more in the form of 
what chaos theorists would refer to as dissipative structures which continuously 
realign (e.g., “molecular”). In other words, it is about how boundaries are sharpened Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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and how internal homogeneity is increased (Delanda, 13). It is these configured 
entities that are then given expressive form. Deterritorialization concerns the always 
present forces of disorganization,
20 destabilization, decoding, disruption, 
antagonism.
21 In this ontology, inherent within any assemblage are tendencies, 
“virtual vectors,” lines of flight that undo stases.
22 
Each assemblage offers greater or lesser capacity, or degrees of freedom, or 
put in yet another way, “possibility spaces” as well as typical attractors (Delanda, pp. 
20, 29-30). The crime control and due process model, for example, are most often 
found together, two wings of the strange (butterfly) attractor; customary justice, a 
point attractor since the inherent tendency is for behavior to follow a centripetal 
pathway toward some cultural norm; transformative justice, torus and strange 
attractors, for substantive rational/irrational principle demand both indeterminacy 
and determinacy, ever in movement toward higher principles of substantive justice. 
Accordingly, we may view each of the justice-rendering approaches as 
assemblages and then critically examine them according to the two constitutive 
axes. We ask, given an approach with its underlying abstract machine, what effects 
are produced in constituting bodies. In a due process assemblage, for example, 
interpellated agents (“spoken subjects”) see themselves as endowed with formal and 
universal rights, as formally equal to others, as centered subjects (e.g., individuals) 
with choice.  
We could also look at each in terms of their capacities (e.g., some offering 
greater involvement of victims in conflict mediation, some less; some offer a more 
restrictive discourse, some less so; some greater concern for context, some less, 
etc.). Let‟s take “customary justice.” Using the notion of assemblages, we could 
examine the material (content) dimension and ask why and how, in this particular 
socius, the particular expressive form appears. For example, why in response to the 
imperatives of adjusting to demanding, often unpredictable environments, did some Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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reliance on the supernatural materialize as the response. Then, on the second axis, 
we may ask, what forces of territorialization persist that produce a more molar or a 
more molecular form. Then, finally, we examine what deterritorialization forces are 
at play. Here, we could identify the forces of rationalization, colonialism, globalism, 
on the one hand, and more inadvertently and subtly, the effects of researchers who 
fundamentally alter the culture being examined.    
We could do a similar exercise applying assemblage theory as a guide and 
apply it to the socialist form of justice-rendering. We could look at the 
transformations taking place in China, Russia, Vietnam, Cuba, Eastern Europe, the 
African Continent and elsewhere, for example, and bring to bear the two axes in 
aiding our understanding of existent forms of justice, and emerging principles. For 
example, we could look at deterritorializing forces such as rationalism and capitalistic 
logic and their effects as China experiences continuous industrialization and 
urbanization. 
23 
 
Semiotic Regimes(linguistic coordinate systems). Each orientation could also be 
studied dynamically in terms of semiotic regimes (subset of “expression” axis) that 
emerge. Instead of the more restrictive signifier-signified couplet composing the sign 
of Ferdinand de Saussure, a Deleuzean approach may very well be more productive. 
It follows Louis Hjelmslev (expression-content, as apposed to signifier-signified). It is 
developed more formally in Deleuze‟s (1988, 1989) late two books on cinema.  
A typology of signs, Deleuze argues, must be constructed deductively from 
actual practice, the images that arise, and their relationships; linguistics, in short, is 
a subset of pragmatics. Although explaining cinema, he is also providing insights on 
consciousness and the thinking process. In Cinema 1, he offers the notion of an 
“organic regime” of signs more rooted in Hegel and Lacan and given exemplary 
cinematic form in film director Sergei Eisentein. Here, given an ongoing stream of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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consciousness in every day life, the coordinates for thinking and action are 
inattentive recognition and habitual sensory-motor schemas. They are characterized 
as linear and deterministic constructions where truth is potentially discoverable in 
the process of judgment. There is a premium on identity, unity and totality; it entails 
being and repetition. In this schema, perceptions are always-already linked to the 
initiation of some habitual action. In Cinema 2 he develops the “crystalline regime,” 
rooted more in Nietzsche, C. S. Peirce, and Henri Bergson and best expressed by the 
French avant-garde film directors Alain Resnais and Alain Robbe-Grillet. Here, given 
a problematic encounter, the sensory-motor schema collapses or is suspended. An 
interval emerges in which uncertainty prevails with various leaps into virtual memory 
for possible constructions of a gestalt or perception. This entails active attention, or 
“active recognition,” where constructing truth is a creative process; it entails an ever 
becoming.  
Deleuze and Guattari, much earlier in A Thousand Plateaus, also develop the 
notion of regimes of signs in some detail, although Deleuze does not return directly 
to this analysis in his late works on cinema. Regimes of signs, they argue, function to 
transmit power, privilege, distinctions, hierarchy, and order through “order words” 
which invoke incorporeal transformations in subjects, much in accord with speech-
act theorists (see also Bogue, 136-149). For example, pronouncing “I do” in wedding 
ceremonies, or “Guilty!” by the judge.
24 The organic regime would tend to exemplify 
a more rigid (molar) incorporeal transformation, whereas the crystalline regime 
would tend toward continuous deterritorialization and release of “lines of flight” that 
produce transcendence (“creative evolution,” in Bergson‟s sense), mutation, 
metamorphosis. 
 The first six forms of justice-rendering we have developed are more 
connected with the organic regime; the next five, an oscillating mixture of the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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organic and crystalline; the last, transformative justice, having the greatest 
connectivity with the crystalline regime. 
Take, for example, our first three models. At the outset, socially constructed 
identities (victims, offenders) are better conceptualized as discursive subject-
positions: the “I” that emerges in everyday discourse within the traditional criminal 
justice system is but a narrowly construed form limiting a fuller understanding of 
demands in living. It is rooted in an organic regime of signs that privileges order, 
stasis, linearity, identity as repetition of the same, a truth to be found not 
discovered, a system of axioms and theorems that lead deductively to a truth, 
subordinating problems to pre-identified static solutions, and a system of judgment, 
following Nietzsche, originating from a presumed objective, transcendental 
perspective (Deleuze, 1989: 137-147; see also Rodowick, 1997: 121-138, 199; 
Delanda, 2002: 121-156). Even, as Woolford (2009: 97) argues, when alternatives 
such as restorative justice reconceptualize the victim and offender as “clients” or 
“agents” they, too, are heavily laden with ideological baggage; in this case, the new 
social constructions, he argues, are but well connected with consumerism and the 
neoliberal economistic ideology of “choice.”
25 The language of “risk” found in the 
actuarial justice model, for example, provides the discursive coordinates for 
furthering a managerial model rather than a basis for looking at wider social contexts 
for problems and possible resolutions (Ibid., p. 98). The family model, however, 
begins to provide an alternative discursive framework in stipulating that conflicts are 
inevitable and that both some form of “shaming” and reconciliation are necessary to 
re-establish order, although an order based on patriarchal and nuclear family 
relations. Woolford (2009) and Pavlich (2005) argue that we need to reconceptualize 
these static categories, and, we would argue, these discursive (“molar”) 
frameworks.
26 They imprison us within the discourse of the master and the discourse 
of the university, contributing to the reification of dominant structures and Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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conventional understandings.
27 Alternatively, more molecular forms are in need of 
development that privileges becoming over being, as in a transformative justice. To 
this we now turn. 
 
Transformative Justice. What might justice look like in a socius identified as 
“permanent revolution?” 
28 We want to focus on a justice of the Other that can be 
traced to the writings of Levinas (1987) and his primary interlocutors: Derrida, 
Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari. 
There are at least three critical questions that are unresolved in this line of 
inquiry: (1) naming the Other – the question of good and bad consequences; (2) 
disappearance into the Other – the question of becoming-imperceptible, or potential 
loss of identity; and (3) restraint v. enabling the Other – the question of privileging 
unique desires of human beings but with possible manifestations of both increasing 
expansion of what the body can do in a positive direction, and also the possibility of 
emerging excessive investors in harm. These three are related to two others: (4) the 
wherewithal of an alternative conceptualization of the subject and (5) vistas for a 
transformative socius. 
 
1.  Naming the Other. In interacting with the Other in a diverse, changing, 
heterogeneous, and risk socius one often, in a particular event, explicitly or implicitly 
names the Other, that is categorizes her/him. This, however, can be both good and 
bad. To the degree one names the Other in a more tentative way –  always awaiting 
for evidence that her/his initial understanding must be modified, and thereby both 
giving some looser structure to the event, but at the same time not imprisoning the 
Other in one‟s own expectations – we experience a possibility for fuller expression of 
becoming-other. At the other extreme, the category may take a life of its own. Here 
the excessive investor in energy to make hierarchical differences, the basis of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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negative energy flow, an act of repression or reduction (i.e., subjugation), denies the 
Other and what her/his body is capable of doing (Milovanovic and Henry, 2005; 
Spinoza, 1994). For example, ethnic cleansing, policies of terra nullius, stigmatizing 
form of shaming, violent purging of those previously associated with a dictatorial 
regime, reversal of hierarchies, politics of revenge, racism, sexism, etc. (see also 
Prum et al, 2007). We also witness reification of categories in identity politics – the 
social construction of social categories with which to identify in struggles may often 
take on a life of their own.  
Advocates of transformative justice must be cognizant of the ever present 
insidious possibilities to reconstitute a regime of denial of the Other in the process of 
naming. 
 
2.  Disappearance into the Other (“becoming imperceptible”). Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987), relying on Levina‟s notion of the concern for the Other, an infinite 
responsibility to the Other,
29 have argued for a becoming-other, and in the extreme, 
becoming-imperceptible where, the logic would go, one becomes Other entirely, a 
disappearance into the socius, a death of the subject,
30 a postmodern form of the 
death drive.
31 In other words, the intensity of the ethic of care for the Other may 
tighten community bondage (“communal suffocation”) to a highly restrictive form, 
ironically turning the tide full circle, curtailing acceptance of difference (White, 1991: 
104-105). We have seen this already in some misguided, dogmatic activists who 
engage in political correctness campaigns.  
White (ibid., 92), aware of the danger that “care always harbors the danger 
that the caregiver will overshelter the other, smother or envelop him or her in a 
blanket of paternalistic (or maternalistic) control,” an “overbearing mode of care,” 
advocates instead, a “lightness of care.”
32 This begins a new direction of inquiry.  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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Benhabib (1987; see also White‟s discussion, 1991: 102-104) has already 
convincingly argued that Rawls‟ and Habermas‟s Kantian views positing the ideal 
position of formal equality from which to begin developing principles of justice, 
erroneously start with an abstract “generalized other,” whereas, we should start with 
a “concrete other.” Thus, not commonality, but differences is the starting point 
(White, ibid: 103; Benhabib, ibid). Further qualifications by Fraser (1986) for a 
“collective concrete other,” bringing into play the group implicated, leads to an “ethic 
of solidarity,” a desirable orientation according to White (ibid: 107). More recently, 
Fraser (2003) has returned to and advocated a communicative ethic of justice 
contrary to those, like Honneth (2003) and Taylor (1992) who focus on recognition 
of the Other as a key component of justice.
33  
Fraser, however, relies on a questionable understanding of discourse; that is, 
sees discourse as basically neutral in and of itself. We have already noted that a 
significant number or researchers in semiotics and linguistics have argued that 
discourse is not a neutral medium within which to express desires. Rather, it already 
constricts how social reality and justice can be constructed; how, for example, order-
words produce incorporeal transformations, how the discourse of the master and 
university produce the différand. Accordingly, “participatory parity” advocated by 
Fraser, does not respond to the non-neutrality of the discourse employed itself. 
Lyotard (1999), for example, has shown how global narratives as apposed to micro, 
or “petit narratives,” restrict constructions and hence does violence to differences.  
Recent discussions have attempted to go beyond the previous themes. 
Honneth (2007) attempts a reconciliation
34 between Habermas and postmodernists 
such as White (1991), arguing that both, whether more explicitly or more implicitly, 
recognize the desirability of equality in participation as a requisite for possible justice 
rendering. Then, drawing out his own implications of some late views expressed by 
Derrida (1988, 2005) on the subject and an earlier introduction of the “third” by Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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Levinas (see Critchley, 1999), concludes that the there is ultimately a “productive” 
but “irresolvable” and “permanent” tension between the concern for the Other and 
formalistic notions of equality, a view shared by Clement (1998), Derrida (2005), 
and by Max Weber (1978) much earlier with his notion of the “irresolvable” conflict 
between the principles of formal and substantive rationality. 
We will show below in our development of a postmodern subject that the 
disappearance into the concrete Other – given the various interacting Others with 
often inconsistent voices that appear – becomes more complex and denies any clear 
line toward becoming- imperceptible. A lightness of care, rather, provides moments 
in which a space is created between self and other in which each‟s framework for 
understanding oscillates – I as Other, the Other as I – begins to resonate and to 
merge with a deeper understanding of differences and commonalities (see also 
White, 1991: 110). 
 
3.  Restraint and enabling. The ethics of care suggests we should foster otherness, 
we should provide an infinite justice to the (concrete) Other. There are no bounds. 
We should enable and foster difference, not sameness. But, recognized, too, is that 
deviations happen. Harms of repression and reduction are real with real 
consequences to both the direct and indirect parties. Spinoza‟s notion that we still 
don‟t know what a body can do appears with a qualification: potentialities exist for 
both active and reactive forces taking form (Deleuze, 1983). Accordingly, Deleuzians 
(see, for example, Patton, 2000) – who advocate becoming-other and reducing 
constraints on the other in order that the person may realize what her/his body can 
do – are quick to point out that this must always be tempered with evaluative 
schemas that in fact respond to negative “lines of flight” (i.e., negative energy flow, 
or what Nietzsche identifies as reactive forces). It would follow, then, that 
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change,
35 but also about fostering principles of justice of care at the micro and 
community level, while responding to harm.  
What follows is that the various ongoing other-orientations will find 
themselves in constant tension. In other words, Weber‟s, as well as Honneth‟s more 
recent analysis, argues convincingly that this tension between principles of formal 
equality and notions of an infinite care to the concrete Other, is insolvable. But being 
insolvable does not mean it is a dead end. Rather, following Honneth, Clement and 
White among others, it can indeed be productive, echoing the words of early 20
th 
Century legal realists and their call for pragmatism instead of strict formalism in law 
and justice-rendering.
36 It is here that a reformulated restorative justice approach 
can be the antidote to harms in society. 
As it stands now, restorative justice is being absorbed by the logic of the 
traditional criminal justice system (see Acorn, 2004; Pavlich, 2005; Woolford, 2009; 
Arrigo et al, 2005). A transformative justice, infused with a bonafied notion of 
subjectivity, and we will offer, below, a modest direction in our Schema QD, would: 
foster differences, while at the same time solidarity; maximize participation by those 
directly and indirectly effected by the harm done; privilege the multiplicities of “petit 
narratives” (Lyotard, 1984, 1999); redefine harm away from the traditional narrow 
legalistic definition of crime (see Henry and Lanier, 2005; Milovanovic and Henry, 
2005); foster, simultaneously, self-analysis and critique of structural forces; privilege 
differentials in needs, abilities and desires; and provide criteria by which we can 
gauge success (see, for example, Woolford, 2009: 153; Fraser, 1997).
37  
If we take our (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996, 2005) reconceptualization of 
crime as harm, operationalized as harms of repression and harms of reduction, and 
the notion of the prevalence of “excessive investors” in hierarchy, then it follows that 
a criteria for transformation is whether these are reduced. Accordingly, a 
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with the traditional criminal justice system and its master discourse and static order-
words, veiled often as a libertarian discourse of the university. Strategies must be 
developed to foster this break, such as those recommended by Woolford (2009; see 
also Arrigo and Milovanovic, 2009; see further below). We must seek, for example, 
creative ways of operationalizing alternative evaluative measure such as those 
advocated by Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari (see especially Patton, 2000: 58-67) 
in terms of activation of active (transformative, metamorphic) over reactive 
(repetitive, limitive, purely hierarchically adaptive) forces; the former, privileging 
active and productive desire and the realization of what the body can do; the latter, 
relying on a desire based on reactive forces and lack, and the capturing of desire in 
system-serving ends. And the nod goes to maximizing “petit narratives” and an 
inseparable on-going discourse of the hysteric/analyst, the “analyst”
38 being both 
initiator and reciprocal Other. If, in hierarchical society, formal equality remains the 
antidote, a “necessary evil,” the ethics of care and justice of the concrete Other 
responds to the call for a more substantive egalitarian, participatory socius.  
 
4. Transformative Agency.  Where to go from here? It seems to me that much 
literature has disregarded subjectivity or agency itself.
39 It has been erased from the 
analysis, it remains a “différend.” Let us provide a conceptualization with which we 
may move forward and which provides a nod to active forms of agency.
40 Agency, we 
ague, is inherently intersubjectively constituted. Fluctuating intensities of each of the 
attributes of our offered Schema QD produce an inherent indeterminacy. Our view 
also incorporates both discourse ethics and recognition of the Other. We need not 
choose between the two.
41 In figure 2, Schema QD, we offer a de-oedipalized version 
of Lacan‟s (1977) Schema R, aided by insights from quantum mechanics.
42 It offers 
how the gestalt, a holistic perception, arises. For our more immediate purposes, how 
also a conception of justice emerges. It offers the basis of an ethical and moral Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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reflective gaze by the subject. In other words, Lacan‟s oedipally-based Schema R 
concerned how “réalité” was constructed, how momentary slices of reality, gestalts, 
or perception-images are internally constituted which then become the basis of social 
action. We want to modify his model. 
 
Figure 2: Schema QD   
 
  
 
Our Schema QD indicates that the subject of justice-conceptualizing, is 
composed of a number of interacting components: drawing from Mead (1962), the 
“me,” self, or ego is the totality of relatively stabilized imaginary self-
conceptualizations one retains tempered by culturally available forms (Foucault, 
1997: 223-251; 1983; 1988; 1990: 25-32 ); from Lacan (1977), the I(O) is the 
more permanent identifications with some internalized ideals of being liked and 
accepted (ideal ego), more explicit in various everyday interactions (Goffman, 
1967); the concrete Other
43 (hereafter referred to as Other to distinguish this form 
from the following two) draws from Benhabib (1987), and here indicates that the 
“me” is constituted intersubjectively via imaginary constructions with this immediate 
Ip 
ego 
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I 
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Other; the concrete generalized Other (the “collective concrete other”), drawing from 
Fraser (1986) in particular, suggests more immediate groups, networks, and 
communities within which the person maintains ongoing relations; the abstract 
generalized Other represents the more macro level of law and universality (i.e., 
notions such as the “reasonable man in law,” the abstract legal subject) and is 
ubiquitously and unilaterally present with effects
44 ; S represents the domain of 
internalized signifiers, be they order-words or master signifiers, each of which are 
embodied with unique desires of the person; I represents the domain of images, 
memory-images, imaginary constructions one has internalized; I and S together are 
part of virtual memory (Bergson, 2002); and the Ip as “subject of speech,” an 
intersubjective product of the three Others, ego, ideal-ego, which takes up residence 
within a particular discourse from which to speak.
45 
Réalité or the gestalt, or, if you prefer, the perceptual image of justice is an 
emergent, the result of the three “Others” interacting with the ego and I(O), 
producing a momentary I, a place marker from which to speak in a particular 
discourse. In other words, it is the result of interactive effects of the four corners of 
the “cut” of Schema QD, and the emergent, momentary stable I, taking up residence 
within a linguistic regime, a place marker from which to speak. And this in a context 
of the Real – political, economic and historical forces, most often configured in more 
molar assemblage form. In his late work on the “care of the self,” for example, 
Foucault (1983, 1988) suggests what form the self may take given a political 
economy, which should be read in conjunction with his earlier work on the 
disciplines. These various components cannot be disconnected in understanding the 
subject. A productive direction for a dynamic explanation of how réalité emerges 
would be to investigate how these three “Others” come into play
46 mediated by 
available cultural forms (e.g., “scripting of the self”)
47 in the formation of a gestalt, 
particularly one depicting a conception of justice. These instances, or “events” in Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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Whitehead‟s (1978) description, cannot be disconnected in understanding the subject 
of justice-rendering.  
The quadrangle marking réalité actually is a flattened Moebius band. If one 
was to develop a 3-dimensional topological model and then activate a twist that is 
constitutive of the Moebius band, connecting the ends, one witnesses that all four 
corners are now connected
48 (ego - concrete generalized Other; I(O) - concrete 
Other). This suggests that the four corners are inseparable; analytical dissection of 
the parts produces a dysfunctional human being. The abstract generalized Other is 
ubiquitous, with various degrees of effectivity, given the interactions at hand. We 
must also recognize the singularities which we are, and differentials in needs, 
abilities and desires. 
Ultimately, there may occur multiple “cuts”; that is, following quantum 
mechanics, at the preconscious level,
49 they may be in superposed or intertwined 
quantum states, each resonating with uniquely constituted memory-images, and it is 
the intensity of attention
50 that “collapses” the wave function producing a particular 
more stable slice, a momentary conceptualization of justice, which becomes the 
basis of action. The subject, in short, is an assemblage and we then look to whether 
the socius and its expressive forms (i.e., semiotic regime) are more enabling of a 
perpetual becoming, a molecular development, or whether they are more restricting 
in form, producing molar organizations and privileging being. We also look at the 
interactive effects of the configured Others.
51 To restrict law-finding practices, for 
example, to some narrowly circumscribed space-time frame in producing a 
responsible subject – an entity which can then be studied in isolation from its 
constituting dynamics such as in exclusive legal practices focusing on narrowly 
constituted “intent” – is to effectively lobotomize the wherewithal of personhood. It is 
to deny the human being‟s construction of justice and consequent justice-rendering Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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practices, divorcing it from the contributing effects of the larger spatiotemporal 
frame of political economy. 
Schema QD, as an assemblage, must be seen as nested within a 
transformative assemblage, which in turn could be situated in a “permanent 
revolution,” with dynamic interactions amongst them. Schema QD is not equivalent 
to a transcendental subject, nor is it a pure illusion; rather, it is midway, flickering 
between the two. It provides a possible direction in understanding agency. 
 
5. Transformative Socius/Assemblage.  Schema QD, as an assemblage, must also be 
seen as nested in a transformative justice assemblage, and both, nested within a 
transformative socius, with dynamic interactions amongst the three. For another day 
is a more fully developed argument, but we offer some direction for further critical 
inquiry. We also need to respond to the call for strategies and for normative theory.  
 
i. Transformative Socius. Not blueprints, but seen more in terms of vistas for 
possibilities, several theorists have been exemplary: Hardt and Negri‟s (2009) and 
Dyer-Witherford‟s (1999) notion of the “commonwealth,” Unger‟s (1987) notion of an 
“empowered democracy,” and Deleuze and Guattari‟s (1987; see also Holland, 1999: 
92-123) call for “permanent revolution.” Here, a running theme is molecular 
assemblages and active lines of flight, whether manifest, respectively, as the 
“multitude,” role-jumbling, or nomadic forms of subjectivity. This molecular form of 
an assemblage, we would hypothesize, engenders a crystalline regime of signs. Risk, 
occasions for conflict, the unexpected would invariably increase, but each would be 
an occasion for crystalline logic. Active recognition rather than the habitual forms 
would be more prevalent, an ongoing “creative evolution” in the Bergsonian sense 
(1998). Rather than Truth being found or discovered in the act of judgment, as in 
the organic regime, Truth emerges, is a process, created in problematic encounters. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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The habitual sensory-motor schema collapses giving way to gaps, intervals and 
suspended action. Not a totalizing discourse, there is an ongoing movement to the 
new, the unforeseen, the creative possibilities.
52 The subject, in turn, is ever 
changing, transforming, metamorphosing, a perpetual becoming. 
The molecular transformative assemblage privileges not the build up of 
theorems,  axioms
53 and the linear forms of deductive logic and syllogistic reasoning 
that are its motors for truth finding that is inherent in a organic regime of signs, a 
tendency of subsuming problems to given solutions (Delanda, 2002: 144), a plague 
of formal rationality; but rather, as in the crystalline form, engages problems which 
confront thought in an active way, evoking consciousness and attentive recognition 
(Rodowick, 1997: 1999; Bogue, 2003: 180; Delanda, 2002: 128-135; Lefebvre, 
2008).Thus the necessity for developing well-posed problems, not hastily defining a 
situation and then finding prior solutions to the issue so defined, as takes place 
predominantly, for example, in the courts in adjudicating cases, what Lefebvre calls 
a subsumptive approach (Lefebvre, 2008). 
 
ii. Strategies. Various strategies have been offered in the progressive literature, both 
at the personal as well as collective level for transformative practices. Woolford‟s 
(2009) transpraxis includes: “play to restorative strengths” (make visible the 
accomplishments and potentialities); “ideas are not enough” (we must confront 
habits, repetition that reproduces the same); “there are opponents” (recognize 
entrenched agents in the criminal justice system and political arena); “seek popular 
rather than professional legitimacy” (professional certification often comes with 
buying into a master discourse); “link up and network” (make linkages with other 
social movements); “keep going” (transformative justice is ongoing, it has no final 
end point); “commit to reflexivity” (engage in constant re-examination of one‟s own 
presuppositions). Arrigo and Milovanovic (2009: 164-169), building on Massumi‟s Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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first five (1992: 103-106), offer six additional strategies for a transpraxis at the 
more personal level: “stop the word”; “cherish derelict spaces,” “study camouflage,” 
“side and straddle,” “come out,” “seek and form alliances,” “be a jazz player,” “invest 
in social judo,” “become-other,” “be active/be joyful,” “cultivate an ethic of care.” 
Other suggestions for expanding the capacities for being human have appeared in 
the literature: Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 161) advocate continuous 
experimentation and becoming-minor 
54; Foucault, curiosity and the benefits of 
liminal zones, and limit-experiences (1990: 8-9: see also Miller, 1993: 30, 31; Lyng, 
2005: 39-47) 
55; Lyng (2005: see also Lippens, 2011), confront and overcome the 
challenges of edgework involving high; Lyotard (1984: 79), assume the position of a 
poet who “hold[s] language…under suspicion,” somewhat in the same direction as 
Rorty‟s (1989)“ironist” who, understanding the contingent nature of history, always 
keeps some distance from conventionality, always ready to question what is and 
what could be; Drucilla Cornell (1998), advocates the sanctity of the imaginary 
domain where things can always be otherwise, a place of experimentation. 
 
iii. Normative Theory. Much criticism directed toward postmodernists and those 
advocating a transformative justice has been in terms of a presumed vacuity of 
normative theory. Moreover, it is said that it provides a predominantly external 
rather than an internal critique (Litowitz, 1999).
56 In briefly responding, we will 
divide our remarks to distributive justice and retributive justice.  
Distributive justice, or how resources and burdens are fairly allocated, finds 
several approaches that have gone beyond Marx‟s “from each according to his [her] 
abilities, to each according to his [her] needs.” It may very well be that to go from 
molar to molecular transformative assemblages a transitional form of justice may be 
pragmatically useful.
57 Jeffrey Reiman‟s (1990) “difference principle,” for example, 
building on Rawls, has offered a transitional form of justice, a materialistically based Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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moral theory where competition will be preserved, incentives will be maintained, 
while the worse-offs are incrementally and systematically empowered and rewarded. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987; Deleuze, 1983; see also Patton, 2000: 58-67), 
rooted more in Nietzsche, have offered an evaluative schema for deciding whether a 
social policy producing a “line of flight” is good or bad. It centers on the mobilization 
of “active” or reactive forces.” Active forces are those that increase the productive 
capacities of persons (the capacities to be affected and be effective); reactive, those 
that diminish these capacities. Active forces are inherently transformative; reactive, 
restrictive. Patton (ibid, 63; see also Braidotti, 2006: 4) cautions us in saying that 
these two forces are in dynamic relation, always having the potential of changing 
into each other, and only by way of a meticulous ongoing genealogical analysis
58 can 
we conclude as to its efficacy.
59 Further, it is argued that ultimately, in this 
evaluative schema, we ask: to what degree are molecular rather than molar forms 
emerging?, where the former are more “dissipative structures” ever responsive to 
even the slightest input and producing lines of flight that increase capacities, 
opportunities, potentialities; the latter more ossified, formally rational, hierarchical 
bureaucratic regimes, that are restrictive.
60 
Nancy Fraser (1997, 2000; see also Woolford‟s comments, 2009: 150-153) 
has offered three aspects to a transformative justice. “Recognition” focuses on the 
degree of recognition of the concrete Other. Non-recognition is compatible with our 
notions of harms of repression and reduction (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996) where 
exclusionary practices diminish a persons‟ full capacities. “Redistribution” focuses 
more on economic harms. A transformative form of redistribution advocates a 
fundamental reordering of the labor market that systematically reduces life chances. 
“Representation” advocates transparency and inclusionary practices. As Woolford 
(2009: 153) summarizes: the litmus test of whether a transformative justice is in 
progress, the “analytical guideposts,” is the degree to which each of the three Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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aspects are more transformative rather than merely affirmative (the latter are more 
superficial, non disruptive changes and do not respond to structural, material 
forces).  
Perhaps the exemplary statement on a postmodern ethics comes from May 
(1994: 121-137). After reviewing Deleuze, Foucault, and Lyotard, and noting their 
reticence for developing a full fledged statement on ethics, he suggests that 
implicitly all three advocate two elements of an ethical principle: 
“antirepresentationalism” (not representing others in their behalf); promoting 
differences (which could also incorporate an ethic of care), with the caveat, “as much 
as possible” and “all things being equal.”
61 Fraser‟s idea of recognition and 
representation is in a similar direction.  
Therefore, we now have four elements for an evaluative schema: evaluation 
based on active and reactive forces, antirepresentationalism, promoting differences, 
and genealogical evaluation. We also draw from Marx‟s classic “needs” principle. In 
short, let us offer a postmodern ethical principle underlying as transformative 
distributive justice that draws from the various perspectives we have reviewed:  
 
„From each according to [her/]his abilities, to each, according to his[/her] 
needs‟ and desires; tempered, as much as possible, by the promotion of 
differences and antirepresentationalism, and subject to genealogical 
evaluation of forces.  
 
Retributive justice, or how we respond to harm, is squarely within the thrust 
of those advocating a transformative justice as apposed to merely currently practised 
restorative justice. Foucault (1981) has asked us to consider doing away with 
punishment all together, for, following Nietzsche, it answers to other deeper needs 
and insecurities that remain uninvestigated in the act of punishment. Braithwaite‟s Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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(1989, 2002) “reintegrative shaming,” on the other hand, suggests that some form 
of disapproval is necessary where we find excessive investors in harms of 
reduction/repression, but followed by reintegration. Clearly, a definitional issue of 
punishment is at stake. We follow a milder form: social disapproval, without 
necessarily implicating schemas of penal punishment. If confinement can be justified, 
then, it follows we are in need of ethical principles pertaining to those so confined 
(see Arrigo et al, forthcoming; Williams and Arrigo, 2008; Bersot and Arrigo, 2010; 
Ward, 2010). We see Ward‟s (2010; see also Beyleveld and Brownsword, 2001) 
suggestion of the principle of “dignity,”
62 not contrary to, but as a compliment to 
Bersot and Arrigo‟s “virtue-based ethics.”
63 
 
A postmodern retributive evaluative principle for a transformative justice would 
include the following concepts: 
 
Degree to which measures deliver a transparent message of 
disapproval in a least-restrictive, collaborative, transparent, and 
transformative form; active and meaningful participation of those directly 
affected by harm, with involvement, as much as possible, by those indirectly 
affected; opportunities for ongoing reconceptualization of victims, offenders, 
community, networks and other social assemblages, and their implementation 
into practice; where employment of incarceration, prioritizing respect, 
concern, and redemption practices and scripts; diminution of subjugation and 
domination in institutions and social practices (assemblages), and privileging 
active, molecular lines of flight; the holistic reintegration of excessive 
investors in harm with presumption of equal moral worth; degree to which 
our distributive evaluative schema is co-determinative in the responsive 
process; all subject to genealogical evaluation of forces. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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  Our principle draws from a number of contributing authors, not all of which 
would necessarily self-identify with a transformative justice nor with 
poststructuralist/postmodern thought.
64 Key contributing works have been by Pavlich 
(2005), Acorn (2004), Woolford (2009), Woolford and Ratner (2008), Arrigo and 
Milovanovic (2009), Milovanovic and Henry (1991 [2009]), Maruna (2001), 
Braithwaite (2002), Parker (1999), Sullivan and Tift (2001), amongst the most 
prominent, but driven by the works of Deleuze and Guattari. A “virtue-based ethics” 
(Bersot and Arrigo, 2010) and an ethics of “dignity” (Ward, 2010; Beyleveld and 
Brownsword, 2001), in our view, would be included as a partial operationalization of 
our postmodern retributive ethics. We would also suggest that given the mobilization 
of these elements that a crystalline regime of signs (Deleuze, 1988,1999) would be 
engendered along with a “creative evolution” (Bergson, 1998). Ultimately, a 
transformative justice, as well argued by Woolford (2009: 148), and well in line with 
the work of Deleuze and Guattari, is a work in progress, resisting static (molar) 
conceptualizations. 
 
Conclusion 
Our conclusion is hopefully only a beginning for further critical inquiry on the 
wherewithal of justice. There is much to be done. Our typology of justice-rendering 
approaches provides a quick access, or orientation to some of the more manifest 
historical forms. Our typology can be the basis of further critical reflection of our own 
justice system and possible change. In the discussion section we furthered a 
transformative justice. We indicated the importance of integrating some concept of 
the subject in our theorizing. Accordingly, we offered Schema QD as a possible 
conceptualization and how a momentary conception of justice, a “slice” or réalité, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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emerges that becomes the basis of action. The ethics of the Other has much merit 
but needs further theorizing. It is time to rise to the challenge. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 To mention only a few alternative names: see School of Justice and Social Inquiry at Arizona 
State University; Justice Studies Department at Northeastern Illinois University; Centre for 
Studies in Social Justice at the University of Windsor. 
2 Weber, of course, is the inspirational theorist for this thrust. 
3 Weber has offered a schema by which he ranges rationality (predictability) by formality 
(extent to which one decides by using internal criteria). Thus, four ideal types emerged: (1) 
formal rationality is identified as high in rationality and high in formality; (2) formal 
irrationality is where there is adherence to a body of formal material but it‟s application 
nevertheless is unpredictable; (3) substantive rationality is where some outside principle, 
norm, logic, idea is at play, but once identified is applied to all similarly situated in a similar 
predictable way, and (4) substantive irrationality which is both highly informal in terms of 
which logic, principle or body of rules is employed, and highly irrational, since little 
predictability exists as to how the chosen logic, principle, or body of law is applied.  
4 There has been a long and luminous critical exposé of the non-neutral nature of discourse: 
see, for example, Lacan (1977), Whorf (1956), Wittgenstein (1958), Lyotard (1999), C.S. 
Peirce (1931), Deleuze and Guattari (1987), Rossi-Landi (1983).   
5 Lacan‟s (1991) four structured discourses, below, include the discourse of the master, 
university, hysteric, and analyst. There are four factors and four positions in this schema for 
each discourse. The four factors are S2, which stands for a body of knowledge imbedded 
within a discourse in use; S1 master signifiers or those signifiers that have been internalized 
early in one‟s life and receive further reinforcement by the particular socius within which one 
primarily lives; $ represents the split subject, the subject of discourse, a notion that suggests 
the person is inseparable from the discourse which speaks him/her; and a represents many 
things for Lacan, and only in particular application can it be provided a working definition. 
Here it represents pas-toute, the left out, the more than enjoyment, the excess both beyond 
and below some threshold. The four positions include: upper left, the initiator of the message; 
upper right, the receiver of the message; bottom right, what is done with the message, what 
production takes place in the unconscious; the lower left, the unique Truth of the subject, 
his/her particular nuanced givens. Now the four discourses: the discourse of the master finds 
the sender of the message as S1, the sender of master signifiers; the receiver produces S2, a 
body of knowledge from these master signifiers; this in turn produces an effect in the 
unconscious, here a feeling of pas-toute, left out,excess; finally, we find the split subject in 
the place of Truth. In other words, the agent who is imprisoned in a particular discourse 
populated with very specific forms of master signifiers. The discourse of the university 
witnesses, by way of a quarter of a turn, S2, a body of knowledge such as a given paradigm in 
the sender‟s location; little a in the receiving location, meaning that the subject is in a position 
of enacting the message without feeling a sense of satisfaction, completion; the split subject is 
the production in the unconscious, meaning that s/he remains in a disconnected state; and 
finally, master signifiers remain unchanged and the basis of S2 production. The discourse of 
the hysteric witnesses the struggling subject in the position of the initiator of the message, a 
person who appears in the form of challenging some regime, on the one hand, to the clinical 
hysteric on the other; the agent‟s communication to the other produces a response, S1, 
master signifers being offered as an explanation to the agent; this produces S2 in the 
unsconscious, a body of knowedge generated by the master signifiers imposed; finally 
terminating in little a, the struggling agent still feeling left out, incomplete. The discourse of 
the analyst is where the agent feeds back to the person in struggle (the receiver of the 
message) what is incomplete, the excess; the response is production, but in a two-stage 
process. First, alienation, a distancing from previous master signifiers; they are seen as less 
significant in narrative construction. Second, separation, whereby new master signifiers, less 
resistant to closure, more processual are substituted. This produces S2 as Truth, a new body 
of knowledge, which then offers the initiating agent (therapist, cultural revolutionary) 
information of what is left out, the excess, a, which, again, is communicated to the receiver. 
This process continues producing new, non static, master signifiers better embodied with 
desire and more in tune with context (i.e., Freire‟s “true words,” 1973). 
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S1 →  S2                                       S2    →   a 
$   ←   a                                         S1   ←    $ 
 
Discourse of the hysteric         discourse of the analyst 
$   →   S1                                       a      →   $ 
a  ←    S2                                       S2    ←  S1 
6 For how legal discourse structures reality, see particularly Heffer (2005). For an offering of 
how alternative signifiers and discourse may emerge by way of an integration of Lacan‟s four 
discourses and chaos theory, see Milovanovic, 2005. 
7 See Packer (2004). See also commentary by Nasheri (1998), Herman (1997), and Yant 
(2003). 
8 Recall, the Marxist principle is “from each according to his [her] abilities, to each according 
to his [her] needs” which indicates variability in needs and abilities. 
9 See Milovanovic and Henry (2005). Harms of reduction is where one is reduced from a 
position one has enjoyed; harms of repression is where one is denied the ability to develop 
one‟s potentialities. 
10 White (1991: 125) has operationalized this orientation to otherness as a “grieving for all 
those who bear the added burden of a life of needless suffering and injustice.”  It is at once 
focused on grieving the other, and delight in what emerges as difference and possibility (ibid., 
110). 
11 As White (1991: 91-92) informs us, “care always harbors the danger that the caregiver will 
over shelter the other, smother or envelop him or her in a blanket of paternalistic (or 
maternalistic) control.” He calls for a “certain lightness of care” as a substitute for the 
potential suffocating of the other.                                                                                                                           
12 Fraser (1986), in responding to an ethic of care, has reconceptualized the ethic as an “ethic 
of solidarity” which stems from struggles, movements and the core master signifiers and 
narratives employeed. 
13 Each “social entity” is, in turn, an assemblage, assemblages nested within assemblages. 
14 Flows vary in speeds, intensities, thresholds, critical points, and their manifest attractor 
states. Elsewhere, we have called it a COREL set (see Henry and Milovanovic, 1996). Deleuze 
(1987: 69) has defined it as: “a multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous terms 
and which establishes liaisons, relations between them across ages, sexes and reigns – 
different natures.” 
15 He does, in passing, going beyond Deleuze and Guattari‟s (1987) analysis, identify a third 
intersecting axis (ibid, 19): “specialized expressive media” may intervene, which, on the one 
end of the axis, “consolidate and rigidify the assemblage,” on the other end, “allow the 
assemblage a certain latitude for more flexible operation while benefiting from genetic or 
linguistic resources (processes) of coding and decoding.”  
16 Deleuze and Guattari, following the tradition of Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Bergson, to name a 
few, conceptualize the universe as various subterranean forces that exist with diverse 
intensities, often clashing. Immanent to all social reality is the “plane of consistency,” a 
quantum field within which various abstract machines induce change. Deleuze and Guattari 
develop the concept of an “abstract machine,” a logic that once developed molds bodies into a 
distinctive form. These “machines” produce “slices” in the ongoing material flow and, 
accordingly, are said to shape bodies (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 36). We conceptualize 
these “slices” functioning to collapse the wave function. Foucault‟s panopticism is but one 
form; Marx‟s commodity-exchange is another. 
17 Foucault‟s two contributions here would be the disciplinary mechanisms that produce bodies 
of docility/utility, and in his late works on self-disciplining, the “scripting [care] of the self.” 
18 As Deleuze and Guattari (1987:88) say, it concerns “a collective assemblage of enunciation, 
of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies.” Delanda (2006: 
3) tells us that “language plays an important but not a constitutive role.” We disagree. 
Discussion in A Thousand Plateaus concerning “signifying regimes” indicates the converse. 
19 The material and the expressive dimensions are always in “reciprocal presupposition” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 90); the causal arrow may work in both directions as 
constitutive theory implies. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
2011, Vol. 3 (1):1-56    Milovanovic  
 
53 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that a product of deterritorialization are “lines of flight,” 
some active leading to increased capacities, some, reactive, leading to stasis, repetition. On 
the “plane of consistency,” the plane where matter is unformed, which underlies all “reality,” 
are “lines of continuous variation” that assure continuous change (see Bogue, 1989: 149). 
21 Consider, for example, Durkheim‟s (1964) analysis of the division of labor in society. For 
content, we could include the particular type of solidarity in existence (mechanical, organic). 
For expression, he argues a particular system of law develops as a consequence of a particular 
content. In a society with a predominance of the organic form he argues, with evidence being 
somewhat inconclusive on this point, restitutive law would primarily exist. Forces of 
deterritorialization would be the Darwinian principle of “social density.” Or consider formalism 
in law, countered by forces for informalism; however, with moments of informalism in 
ascendance, voices for more formalism and less discretion surface. Or, consider Weber‟s 
(1978) classic “insoluble conflict” thesis, the dialectics between formal rationality and the 
always present principles of substantive rationality. 
22 Deleuze and Guattari argue that libidinal economy (“desiring production”) is about paranoiac 
forces of stasis in antagonism with schizo forces of metamorphosis. 
23 Or, following Marxists, we could cite dialectical materialism as the deterritorializing force. 
24 Bogue (1989: 138) following Deleuze and Guattari summarizes two examples: In Foucault‟s 
Discipline and  Punish “expression…[stands for] the collection of judgments, verdicts, 
evaluations  and classifications which transform bodies through the discourse of delinquency”; 
in their readings of Kafka, “its acts, its death sentences and its verdicts, its trials, its „law.‟” 
25 Woolford (2009) and Pavlich (2005), building on Foucault‟s idea of pacification and 
disciplining bodies as well as his late works on governmentality and the “care of the self,” 
suggest that current restorative justice practices essentialize categories and are but “soft” 
versions of coercion. 
26 Consider Maruna‟s (2001) insightful study on “making good,” where he argues for the 
desirability of “redemption scripts,” or narratives that offer greater capacities for 
understanding, change, transcendence, mutation, metamorphosis. 
27 We are also reminded of Althusser‟s classic notion of “interpellation,” of film theory‟s notion 
of the “spoken subject,” and of Deleuze and Guattari‟s (1987) notion of “points of 
subjectification whereby the subject of speech is the end result. 
28 Conceptually, the outlines of a desirable “permanent revolution” are clear: a more dynamic 
society in far-from-equilibrium conditions; privileging emergent structures that are more in the 
form of dissipative structures or molecular forms; privileging becoming over being; human 
beings seen more as singularities, but still capable of forming solidaristic communities (i.e., 
the “multitude,” Hardt and Negri, 2009); democratic, decentralized decision-making; 
protections against excesses of majorities; redistribution of wealth; guaranteed support for 
health, minimal wage, and shelter; fulfilling and participatory work organizations; the 
overcoming of harms of repression and reduction (subjugation); privileging active over 
reactive forces, the molecular (dynamic change, becoming) over the molar (repetition, 
homeostasis); transparency at all levels; principles of justice (both distributive and retributive) 
that relay on some notion of reconciliation; active involvement of all involved; care, peace, 
and a duty to the Other, to name a few often mentioned in the progressive literature. 
29 See also Gilligan‟s ethic of care (1982), Sevenhuijsen (1998). 
30 For a useful analysis of the positive aspects of this “death,” see Braidotti (2006: 261-262). 
31 A re-immersement into a universal quantum wave, interconnected non-locally with all. 
32 This lightness of care would “share the mood and measure of more intense care; but its 
distinctiveness and palpability would not be directly anchored in the needs and motivations of 
intimate relations, but rather in the needs and motivations that are forming in the context of 
our frustrations and dissatisfactions with modernity” (see also White, 1991: 91-94). 
33 Honneth‟s (2003, 2007) point is that a denial of recognition leads to impairment in self-
understanding in intersubjective interactions. It consequently leads to reduction or 
suppression of self-realization. 
34 See also the classic argument by Critchley (1999) who argues for the potential marriage 
between Habermas and Derrida. 
35 Recent works by Hardt and Negri, particularly their Commonwealth (2009), Unger, False 
Necessity (1987), Dyer-Witherford, Cyber Marx (1999), and earlier foundational work by Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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Deleuze and Guattari Thousand Plateau (1987) and their advocating a “permanent revolution” 
provide a plausible direction. See also Arrigo and Milovanovic, Revolution in Penology (2009). 
36 See for example, Lefebvre‟s (2008) Deleuzian approach to jurisprudence as an example of a 
Bergsonian “creative evolution.” 
37 Conceptually speaking, Deleuze and Guattari‟s ultimate criteria would be the degree to 
which a permanent revolution is being sustained, while simultaneously fostering becoming-
minoritarian, becoming-other, privileging molecular over molar structures at all levels of the 
socius and personhood. Woolford‟s move to an operationalization makes use of Fraser‟s (1997) 
three components, recognition (misrecognition is harm done to the other), redistribution 
(material and socially exclusive practices), and representation (exclusion from decision-
making) and whether they are more passively (affirmatively), or more actively 
(transformatively) being confronted.  
38 We read “analyst” more in terms of Paulo Freire‟s (1973) cultural revolutionary engaged in a 
dialogical pedagogy, being neither representative of  a party vanguard, nor the provider of a 
blueprint for social change; rather, more a facilitator, a catalyst, helping to pose a better 
formulation of a problem, and an agent encouraging the development of new master signifiers 
that are more open ended, dynamic and the basis of more genuine constructions of self, 
others, and the present and possible future socius (see for example, Milovanovic, 2003 where 
we integrate Lacan, dialogical pedagogy and chaos theory in suggesting how alternative 
master signifiers may develop in legal practices).  
39 But see Lippens‟ (forthcoming) instructive integration of Bergson‟s élan vital, Sartre‟s notion 
of choice and responsibility, and Deleuze‟s notion of the “fold”; ironically, it is from 
nothingness, a void, an emptiness from which consciousness actively begins its narrative 
creations. 
40 Even Critchely‟s (1999: 277) insightful and illuminating exposition of the differences 
between Derrida and Levinas suggests the importance of some component of psychoanalysis 
to further the dialogue. 
41 As was the case in the debate between Fraser and Honneth in Redistribution or Recognition 
(2003). 
42 Several prominent researchers have argued for the existence of quantum consciousness, 
noting that current more Newtonian constructs have not caught up with recent literature (see 
for example, Penrose and Hameroff, 1996;  Stapp, 1999, 2004; Schwartz, Stapp and 
Beauregard, 2004; Eastman and Keeton, 2003). The brain, for example, is often explained by 
Newtonians in analogous terms to computer functioning. With the development of quantum 
computers within the foreseeable future it would seem another more productive analogy will 
emerge. 
43 Levinas introduces an Other outside of the immediate dyadic relationships as the “third” 
connected with social rules, social order, morality, justice, judgment. We build on this in 
conceptualizing three forms of the “third” varying in proximity to the dyadic relationship, from 
the concrete Other, to the generalized Other (of some group/community/locality), to the more 
distant abstract Other. 
44 See for example Deleuze and Guattari (1987) notion of a “point of subjectification” whereby 
a subject of speech emerges from a speaking subject, which in turn finds its origins at some 
“point” marking the sender of the message in the Lacanian construction in the four discourses. 
Althusser‟s notion of interpellation also comes to mind. 
45 The literature has provided a variety of notions of the I: for Lacan, a shifter in discourse, a 
minor player, better conceptualized as the speaking being (parletre); for Mead, the more 
spontaneous, unpredictable, biological component of a person; for Deleuze and Guattari, only 
arriving at the last phase of the passive syntheses in a recognition, “that‟s me!; for Bergson, 
having a passive existence in everyday action, but a more active form in problematic 
encounters (e.g., active recognition). 
46 Derrida (1988:641) poses the rhetorical question: “Does not my relation to the singularity 
of the Other as Other pass through the law? Law here being equivalent to the „third,‟ 
representing an abstract generalized other and universality. To build on Derrida, the Ip that 
emerges, that is an “occasion” or “event” (see Whitehead, 1978), is a moment where these 
various components, following quantum mechanics, are in a “superpositioned,” intertwined or 
entangled state, a notion compatible with Deleuze and Guattari‟s (1987) notion of a “plane of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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immanence.” In the instance, various possible outcomes are simultaneously present. In other 
words, for quantum mechanics these too can be envisioned as being described by the wave 
function, and here too, the superpositioned components can collapse producing a particular 
gestalt which becomes the basis of intersubjective conduct. A collapse of the wave function is 
where any observation, measurement, or interaction with the environment produces an event, 
one possibility amongst many others. Space limitations do not allow a full exposition here but 
the question as to what triggers this gestalt remains a challenging task. It would seem much 
evidence centers on “attention” and how it produces this superpositioned state and a collapse. 
Active attention produces a collapse. Passive attention, such as in the unconscious, produces 
repetition of the same. Absent active attention, the passive subject is a prisoner of 
objectification and consequent repetition, and, as some have argued, more likely to act very 
much like a script dictates (Matza, 1969). 
47 Deleuze‟s (1995) of a “control society” going beyond Foucault‟s surveillance society 
indicates the emerging postmodern society. See also Lippens‟ (2011) intriguing analysis of 
new “forms of life” that are emergents. 
48 Further, the Moebius band is also constitutive of a topological structure referred to as the 
cross-cap, a four dimensional figure imbedded in 3-D space for exposition. It shows the 
immersion of the “cut” and the singularity found at the end of the spiraling inward Moebius 
band representing the deeper connection to the unconscious and the subterranean, primordial 
quantum field. 
49 The “cut” is a surface with an additional depth dimension that encompasses the pre-
conscious, a more dynamic substratum that included superposed/intertwined quantum states, 
with continuity with an even deeper level, the quantum field itself. 
50 We recall, Freud, in his earlier writings, posited “attention” as being the agency which was 
responsible for hypercathexis, producing the release of bundled energy, resulting in the 
emergence of an idea or thought. After 1919, having attempted several drafts on attention, he 
dropped this idea and destroyed his drafts. Perhaps, upon reflection, he was moving too much 
toward privileging conscious agency in the psychic apparatus? For the importance of 
“attention” in the collapse of the wave function, see Schwartz et al, 2004. 
51 As Bauman (1993) says, however, balancing the calls of the Others is inherently an 
unstable undertaking, increasingly so in current “risk society.” 
52 See for example Lefebvre‟s (2008) Deleuzian application  to legal judgments where he 
compares the linear constructions in law, a “subsumption theory” where a judge  subsumes a 
“case” under a given law for its resolution, a form of inactive recognition/judgment, to an 
active form where there is a search for new ways of understanding the concrete encounter and 
developments of new principle that may resolve it.   
53 Deleuze and Guattari (1983) have referred to this as overcoding, an axiomatic system, a 
system of “capture,” rigid restrictions placed on otherwise creative flows (see also Patton, 
2000: 94-99). 
54 “Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an 
advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of 
flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of 
intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 161). 
55 “There is not a book I have written,” Foucault has said (cited in Miller, 1993: 31), “that does 
not grow, at least in part, out of a direct, personal experience.” His late work on the history of 
sexuality was to also see his experimentations with sexuality and S/M, which, ultimately led to 
his contracting AIDs and succumbing in 1984 (ibid.). Miller sees these personal experiences 
reflected in Foucault‟s late work (1983), “The Scripting of the Self.” Elsewhere, Foucault has 
stated (1990: 9): “The object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one‟s own history 
can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently.” 
56 However, see the recent debate on ethics in penology in the Journal of Theoretical and 
Philosophical Criminology (2010: volume 2). See also Arrigo et al (forthcoming), Bersot and 
Arrigo (2010). 
57 Recall, for Nietzsche and Deleuze, that advocating in advance an external measure or 
standard by which to compare, is exemplary of the domination of reactive forces. It may, 
however, be a necessary evil in transitions. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Justice-Rendering Schemas 
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58 For a good introduction to genealogical analysis see May, 1994: 89-119. Its key 
components have been developed from Nietzsche and Foucault. These include: contingency, 
uncertainty, non-linearity, emergents, surprise, unpredictability, are key elements. 
59 Take for example some form of Left activism that advocates “reversal of hierarchies.” 
60 See also Todd May‟s (1995) “multivalue consequentialism.” “It allows for guidance and 
evaluation of acts, evaluation of situations, and a relative weighing of moral goods (p. 93),” 
although we would have some reservations with his inclusion of “rights,” along the lines laid 
out by Lefebvre‟s (2008: 85-87) reading of Deleuze, that is, they tend to ossification. Braidotti 
(2006: 158-59, 209) also explains potential limits to experimentation. Corporeal warnings, for 
example, can be indicators of “too much.” “An unsustainable relation,” she argues (p.209), 
“…stops the flow of relations to others and as a result the subject encounters the state of 
termination of its intensity. Given that intensity is the body‟s fundamental capacity to express 
its joy, positivity and desire…to put a stop to it marks the death of desire.”  
61 There is compatibility here with Braidotti‟s (2006) call for a “sustainability ethics.” 
62 Two elements are “empowerment” (increasing potentials in exercising agency) and 
“constraint” (reductions in harms of reduction; see also Milovanovic and Henry, 2005). 
63 This has origins in Aristotle and his notion of the necessity to be able to communicate and 
associate with others. They argue the same necessity goes against excesses in penal practices 
that focus on isolation.  
64 Space limitations here preclude a fuller explication. 